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Abstract
What types of policy intervention had a greater impact during the financial crisis? By
using a detailed dataset of worldwide policy, we answer this question focusing on
Global Systemically Important banks (G-SIBs), looking both to stock returns and
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads reactions. As robustness checks, we also analyze
a control sample of 31 large Non-Financial Companies (NFCs). Overall, we show that
different policy interventions from governments and central banks have produced
diverse market reactions: investors generally appreciate monetary policy interven-
tions for G-SIBs (but not for NFCs) and do not welcome bank failures and bailouts
(for both G-SIBs and NCFs).
JEL classification: E52, E58, G14, G21
“ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro.
And believe me, it will be enough”
Mario Draghi, July 26, 2012
1. Introduction
On July 26, 2012, the Chairman of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi
delivered his famous statement during a speech at the Global Investment Conference in
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London.1 In the middle of the European sovereign debt crisis, Draghi’s speech immediately
had a strong impact on European financial markets: Eurostoxx gained 4.3% the day of the
speech (8.1% up to the end of July), IBEX 6.1% (13.1% up to the end of July), S&PMIB
5.6% (12.4% up to the end of July), CAC40 4.1% (7.1% up to the end of July), and DAX
2.8% (6.0% up to the end of July). To provide a more accurate assessment of the impact
of Draghi’s speech on a global basis, we ran an event study around July 26, 2012:2 in
Figure 1, we report the estimated Abnormal Returns (ARs) around Draghi’s speech, focus-
ing on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). Our estimates clearly show that
financial markets fully believed in the ECB President statement: ARs were substantial not
only for most European banks, but also for institutions located in other currency areas
(e.g., USA). In terms of value (i.e., the product of registered abnormal returns and market
capitalization), shareholders of European banks gained more than 2 EUR billion. Banks
located in other currency areas also registered a strong positive reaction, providing evidence
in favor of financial markets globalization.
Although Draghi’s speech was not a monetary policy intervention (in the strict sense), it
is a vivid example that financial markets give great attention to any action (even noncon-
ventional) undertaken by policymakers to reduce risk and uncertainty in financial markets.
Indeed, policymakers throughout the world have run a wide set of policy interventions
using new instruments and techniques to restore the stability of the financial and banking
systems following the financial crisis. At the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, cen-
tral banks’ interventions aimed to contain it seemed to be working. Although the losses in
the subprime mortgage market were substantial, they still seemed manageable and most
policymakers hoped that the worst was over and that the financial system would begin to
recover (Mishkin, 2010). However, a tremendous set of shocks was recorded in September
2008, such as the Lehman Brothers and AIG collapses, and the run of the Reserve Primary
Fund (Mishkin, 2010). From that moment, the financial crisis evolved into a global crisis,
generating severe economic contraction.
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Figure 1. CARs for G-SIBs on July 26, 2012. This figure shows results from the event study conducted
on July 26, 2012 over all G-SIBs listed in Table III. For Groupe BPCE, we considered the listed con-
trolled company NATIXIS.
1 The text of Draghi’s speech is available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/
sp120726.en.html
2 For further details about our empirical approach, see Section 3.1 “Estimating abnormal returns for
stock prices”.
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The central questions are now: what types of policymakers’ interventions have a greater
impact on the banking sector during the financial crisis? Do all G-SIBs have a similar sensi-
tivity to these interventions? Are there significant differences across the main currency areas
(e.g., Euro Area [EUR] versus United States [USA])? Do large Non- Financial Companies
(NFCs) have a similar reaction of G-SIBs to policy interventions? Our article aims to an-
swer these questions by assessing the market reaction to a detailed set of policy interven-
tions undertaken during the financial crisis (i.e., 1,322 policy interventions made between
June 1, 2007 and June 30, 2012). We have four major results. First, policy interventions by
governments and central banks have produced a very heterogeneous market reaction for
G-SIBs’ stock prices and Credit Deafult Swap (CDS) spreads, with some significant differ-
ences across types of intervention and geographic regions. At the opposite extreme, the ef-
fect on the NFCs stock price is generally negative, probably indicating that investors have
perceived these interventions as exclusively in favor of banks, or coming from a worsening
in the economic outlook. Second, for both G-SIBs and NFCs, investors do not welcome
bank failures and bailouts, suggesting that they prefer action rather than inaction (or late
action) by authorities when facing a period of crisis. Third, the effect of announcing meas-
ures to support the financial industry is diverse across regions (i.e., more positive in the
EUR and less in the USA), reflecting a different sentiment for public aid to banks. Finally
(fourth), the model that considers only domestic interventions shows a higher explanatory
power than the one including all measures around the world. Despite the international
character of G-SIBs, these banks are not found to be equally responsive to all global inter-
ventions, but are probably more sensitive to policy interventions announced in their own
currency area.
The focus of our article is on the G-SIBs (as released by the FSB on November 4, 2011
and then updated in November 2012), since these are the largest and most interconnected
banks on the global scene and financial stability cannot be assured without the stability of
each of these banks. In addition, all G-SIBs are listed banks, so that the effect of policy
interventions on financial stability can be assessed by estimating the stock market reaction
(focusing on Cumulative Abnormal Returns [CARs]) around the announcement date of
each policy intervention. We also aim to analyze the effect on the G-SIBs’ default risk per-
ceived by investors; as such, we assess the CDS market response calculating the CDS spread
change for all G-SIBs over a short period around the announcement. Finally, to shed some
light on the effect on the whole economy (not only the financial services industry), we also
analyze the policy effect on a sample of 31 NFCs based on the FT Global 500 list of the
world’s largest companies in 2007, ranked on market capitalization at the beginning of the
period investigated.
We adopt the event study approach since it provides us with an accurate identification
strategy, considering the very large number of policy actions investigated (i.e., 1,322 policy
interventions in five years). As outlined by Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), by using
sufficiently narrow event windows, the event study provides a precise estimate of the mar-
ket’s response to central bank announcements. A similar perspective is expressed in various
studies (e.g., Gagnon et al., 2011; Swanson, Reichlin, and Wright, 2011; Fiordelisi,
Galloppo, and Ricci, 2014), which state that under the assumption of market efficiency, the
intervention’s effects occur when investors update their expectations, and not when actual
measures are implemented, and that a one- or two-day estimation window is sufficient to
provide an unbiased estimate of the complete effect of the announcement. As such, and con-
sistent with Jawadi, Arouri, and Nguyen (2010), we adopt a short-run perspective (i.e., one
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day before and one day after the announcement) and consider each announced intervention
as effective, based on the accuracy and rapidity of market reactions in the direction ex-
pected by policymakers.
The remainder of the article is organized into the following sections. Section 2 reviews
previous papers, highlights our contribution, and discusses our research hypotheses.
Section 3 contains a description of the collection procedure we followed to create a unique
dataset of worldwide policy interventions. It also illustrates our econometric approach,
Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature, Contributions, and Hypotheses
Our article brings together two strands of the literature. The first is the literature assessing
the impact of monetary policy interventions on stock market prices and volatility (Bomfin,
2003; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Chulia`, Martens, and
van Dijk, 2010; Rangel, 2011; Rosa, 2011), international bond returns (Bredin, Hyde, and
Reilly, 2010), interest rates (Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Leo`n and Sebestye´n, 2012),
and exchange rates (Hausman and Wongswan, 2011). This literature has largely expanded
during the past decade. Most papers (Bomfin, 2003; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004;
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Chulia`, Martens, and van Dijk, 2010; Hausman and
Wongswan, 2011; Rangel, 2011; Rosa, 2011) focus on the USA to assess how the central
banks’ intervention on interest rates relates to asset prices, while there are very few papers
dealing with other currency areas. Bredin, Hyde, and Reilly (2010) consider the impact and
spillover effects of monetary policy surprises on international bond returns in the UK, the
USA, and the EUR. Jawadi, Arouri, and Nguyen (2010) investigate the relationship between
changes in the 3-month interest rate and the closing price of CAC 40, Dow Jones, and FTSE
100 indices (for France, USA, and UK, respectively). Leo`n and Sebestye´n (2012) analyze the
impact of the ECB monetary policy surprises on interest rates. While there is a large body of
literature assessing the effect of traditional monetary policy interventions, there is little deal-
ing with nonconventional measures. An exception is the work of Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2010,
2012), which considers both conventional and nonconventional measures and compares their
impact on the 3-month LIBOR–Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) spread.
The second strand of literature assesses the effectiveness of policy responses to the global
financial crisis. The number of studies is much smaller than for the former literature strand,
with empirical analyses generally quite narrow in scope and focusing on single measures in
specific markets. For example, McAndrews, Sarkar, A. and Wang (2008) examine the ef-
fectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) in mitigating liquidity
problems in the interbank funding market, while Baba and Packer (2009) analyze the effect
of the swap lines among Central Banks in reducing the dollar shortage problem. Meaning
and Zhu (2011) explore the impact of the recent purchases of Treasury securities by the
Federal Reserve and of gilts by the Bank of England on government bond yields. A more re-
cent study by Pennathur, Smith, and Subrahmanyam (2014) examines the market reaction
to nine US government interventions in response to the crisis for different categories of fi-
nancial institutions (banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and real es-
tate investment trusts). The authors find that these measures generally produce an increase
in risk and a reduction in value.
The starting point for our research is the work by Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2010, 2012): in
comparison with other studies which investigate policy responses to the financial crisis, this
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article has the merit of assessing the effect on the banking sector of a wide set of policy
interventions in various countries. Specifically, Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2012) examines the effect
of policy announcements (fiscal and monetary policy, liquidity support, financial sector
policy, and ad hoc bank failures) on the interbank credit and liquidity risk premia in the
USA, the EUR, the UK, and Japan between June 2007 and March 2009. The authors assess
the policy effect on the day-to-day changes in the 3-month LIBOR–OIS rate spread (the au-
thors consider the LIBOR–OIS spread as a proxy for the liquidity and counterparty risk
premia in the global interbank markets). In summary, the authors show that policy an-
nouncements were usually associated with reductions in the LIBOR–OIS spreads, but no
policy action is better than the others to contain the crisis. A more recent study by
Fiordelisi, Galloppo, and Ricci (2014) investigates the impact of both conventional and
nonconventional monetary policy interventions on the interbank market, on equity indices,
and on the stock price of G-SIBs between June 2007 and June 2012, finding that noncon-
ventional interventions were more effective than standard interest rate decisions in generat-
ing positive price reactions for G-SIBs. Nevertheless, this article does not consider policy
interventions that are different from monetary policy decisions, such as support measures
to the whole financial sector (e.g., the Troubled Asset Relief Program in the USA), or other
relevant events, such as failures and bailouts.
Overall, our article can broadly be categorized as an exploration and extension of the
literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (for some papers in that vein, see
Borio and Zhu, 2012; Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez, 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2013;
Hanson and Stein, 2015; Gertler and Karadi, 2015). In our article, risk appetite could be in-
terpreted as being linked to the market value of equity of the G-SIBs under review, and the
monetary and financial support policies that are considered are tested for their effects on
equity values.3 Our article contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First and
foremost, our article analyzes a large set of policy interventions in the credit industry during
the whole of the crisis. In addition, we provide novel evidence, since we extend Aı¨t-Sahalia
et al. (2012) along three important paths: the time period analyzed, how the effect of policy
interventions on the credit industry is captured, and the differences across currency areas.
First, we extended the time period analyzed from June 2007 to 2012. This extension is
crucial in the light of recent events revealing that the global financial crisis did not end in
2009, as Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2012) supposed. By including three more years of observation,
we are also able to cover the Euro sovereign debt crisis. The time period analyzed is the
same period investigated by Fiordelisi, Galloppo, and Ricci (2014), but we consider a wider
range of policy interventions, not limited to monetary policy decisions. To ensure consist-
ency with previous papers, policy interventions have been classified in several macro cate-
gories, similar to those defined by Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2012): monetary policy, financial
sector policy, ad hoc bank bailouts and failures, and other measures (see Section 3 for more
details).
Second, to capture the effect of policy interventions on the banking sector, we do not
focus our investigation on the interbank market, measuring the impact on the LIBOR–OIS
spread (as in Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2012). Instead, we focus on the banking system by consider-
ing the stock price and CDS reaction of G-SIBs. We believe this is quite novel to the litera-
ture and provides a relevant contribution to understand the effectiveness of governments’
response to the financial crisis. While there is substantial literature assessing the effect of
3 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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interest rate decisions on stock markets, there is a lack of studies on both the effect of
nonconventional monetary policy interventions (such as monetary easing and liquidity sup-
port decisions) and policymakers’ interventions other than monetary ones. To our know-
ledge, the only papers assessing the effectiveness of policy interventions on risk and return
of banks are Panetta et al. (2009), Pennathur, Smith, and Subrahmanyam (2014), and
Fiordelisi, Galloppo, and Ricci (2104). Panetta et al. (2009) investigate government rescue
plans, finding no evidence of a positive stock price reaction. In their opinion, results are
probably explained by concerns about the dilution of shareholders’ rights, public interven-
tion in bank management, and uncertainty regarding the duration of the plan. Looking at
the impact on the CDS market, results are more favorable to government interventions,
showing that the announcement of system-wide rescue packages was followed by a fall in
CDS premia, especially for announcements of capital injections. Pennathur, Smith, and
Subrahmanyam (2014) take into account only nine announcements of post-crisis measures
in the USA, finding that, with the exception of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
the interventions were wealth decreasing and risk increasing for financial institutions.
Fiordelisi, Galloppo, and Ricci (2014) consider only monetary policy interventions, finding
that nontraditional measures have registered a stronger stock price reaction with respect to
standard interest rate decisions. Nevertheless, the recent global financial crisis has also been
a period of unprecedented intensity for policymakers’ interventions other than monetary
ones. These other types of intervention (such as recovery measures for the whole financial
sector or for single banking institutions) have rarely been explored in the financial literature
because they were rare and circumscribed events. Furthermore, the crisis has revealed a
strong interconnection between the real economy, public finance, and stability in the finan-
cial markets, so we believe it is important to consider financial sector policies implemented
by governments to support banks.
Third, we also consider potential differences across several currency areas—whereas
most studies (e.g., Pennathur, Smith, and Subrahmanyam, 2014) focus on a specific geo-
graphic area. This allows us to assess whether global banks respond to all policymakers’
interventions in the same way, regardless of the specific geographic area where they are
located and the stock market where they are listed.
The main research hypothesis investigated here concerns the effect produced by each
policy intervention considered during the financial crisis. Specifically, we posit that each
intervention made during the crisis created value for investors. This means that, once pol-
icymakers announce an intervention, AR for banks’ stocks increase. The underlying idea is
that the announcement of a “successful” policy intervention has: (i) a general impact on the
economy of a country captured by the country’s stock index reaction; and (ii) a specific im-
pact on the stock return of a specific company, due to the idiosyncratic characteristics of
the company itself that make its stock reaction different from the market’s. As such, a pol-
icy intervention increases the net expected present value of a single stock more than the
mean of companies included in the market portfolio, so that it generates positive ARs. A
policy intervention can increase the net expected present value of bank stocks for several
reasons. First, the intervention may directly or indirectly reduce interest rates (and therefore
the cash flows’ discount rate). Second, the intervention may reduce the probability of de-
fault of the G-SIBs or risk premia demanded by investors. Third, the intervention may also
improve the value of future cash flows produced by banks. We are not interested in investi-
gating the reasons behind the abnormal return; our aim is to identify which policy interven-
tions have produced a positive impact on the systemic bank, in terms of “specific”
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reactions. However, the analysis of the impact on the CDS market may provide some useful
insights regarding changes in the banks’ default risk perceived by investors and hence on
the possible weight of increasing risk premia in determining stock returns. Similarly, our
main interest is for the effect of policy interventions on the financial services industry; how-
ever, we also measure the impact on a control sample of large NFCs.
Finally, we also test whether all G-SIBs respond to policy interventions in a similar way,
or whether there are significant differences depending on their location in a specific cur-
rency area.
3. Collecting Policy Interventions
We analyze policymakers’ interventions in five main currency areas:4 the EUR, UK, USA,
Switzerland (CH), and Japan (JPN); we also collect some policy interventions announced in
other countries, treated as a residual category. We consider a 5-year investigation period,
from June 2007 to 2012, covering three different subperiods. Consistent with Aı¨t-Sahalia
et al. (2010, 2012), the first period is between June 1, 2007 and September 14, 2008 (i.e.,
the day before the collapse of Lehman Brothers), labeled as the “subprime crisis phase”.
The second period runs from September 15, 2008 to May 2, 2010, when the Eurozone
members and the International Monetary Fund agreed to a bailout package to rescue
Greece for E110 billion. We label this subperiod the “global financial crisis”. The third
period, labeled the “sovereign debt crisis”, runs from May 3, 2010 to the end of the investi-
gated period.
Overall, we collected 1,322 policy interventions from different sources. For the period
June 2007–March 2009, we draw information from the database compiled by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2010, 2012). For the period from April
2009 to the end of June 2012, we collect data from official announcements (in the form of
press releases) from the European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, Federal
Reserve, and Swiss National Bank. We also draw information from other sources: Factiva,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Bank for International Settlement, Lauder Institute—
Wharton School—University of Pennsylvania, Bank of Ireland, Institut fu¨r Bankrecht (IBR)
Universitat Bern, and Mayer Brown LTD.
Policy interventions have been classified into the following macro categories (consistent
with Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2012): monetary policy, financial sector policy, ad hoc bank bailouts
and failures, and other measures (including stimulus and austerity packages, administrative
measures, restrictions on short selling, and other announcements that do not belong to pre-
vious categories but are believed to generate a significant market reaction). For each of
these macro-categories, we have identified some micro-categories of policy interventions.
Table I summarizes all of the variables used in the article and Table II illustrates our classifi-
cation of policy interventions, the description of each macro- and micro-category, and the
source of information.
One of the main problems in assessing the impact of policy interventions is to deal with
overlapping events. A first intuitive solution would be to set subjective criteria and then
4 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to exclude the Asian experience (i.e.,
Japan) in order to have more homogeneous currency areas. We run all models without Asia and
results remain substantially unaltered. These results are available for readers from the authors
upon request.
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Table I. Variables’ description
This table lists all variables used in the article.
Variables Symbol Description
Cumulated Abnormal
Returns
CAR Cumulated abnormal returns estimated with a sim-
ple market model over a 252-day estimation
period that ends 20 days before the
announcement.
Market-adjusted
returns
MAR Cumulated market-adjusted returns measured as the
simple difference between the stock and the mar-
ket index returns.
Change in CDS
spreads
DCDS Change in 5-year senior CDS spreads (simple differ-
ence in basis points).
Expansionary
monetary policy
MON_POL_EXP Expansionary measures are classified in Interest
rates cut (IR_CUT), Liquidity provision (LIQþ),
and Monetary Easing (MON_EASE).
Restrictive monetary
policy
MON_POL_RES Restrictive measures are classified in Interest rates
increased or unchanged (IR_UNC/INC), and
Liquidity reduction (CONTR).
Interest rates cut IR_CUT IR_CUT indicates interest rate cuts.
Liquidity provision LIQþ LIQþ indicates liquidity provision, in both domes-
tic and foreign currencies.
Monetary easing MON_EASE MON_EASE indicates monetary easing
interventions.
Interest rates
increased or
unchanged
IR_UNC/INCR IR_UNC/INCR indicates interest rates increased or
unchanged.
Liquidity reduction CONTR CONTR indicates liquidity drain or end/reduction
of monetary easing programs.
Financial support FIN_SUPPORT FIN_SUPPORT includes all instruments used to re-
solve systemic banking crises. We distinguish
three types of interventions: Asset Support
(FIN_ASSET), liability support (FIN_LIABL),
and equity support (FIN_RECAP).
Financial support on
assets
FIN_ASSET FIN_ASSET includes recovery measures for banks
in the form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of
bad assets and asset guarantees.
Financial support on
liability
FIN_LIABL FIN_LIABL includes recovery measures for banks
in the form of guarantees for old or new liabil-
ities, enhancement of depositor protection
schemes, and provision of lender of last resort
facilities.
Financial support on
equity
FIN_RECAP FIN_RECAP includes capital injections and nation-
alization (acquisition of controlling share).
End of Financial
Support
END_FIN_SUPPORT END_FIN_SUPPORT includes the end of an in-
strument used to resolve systemic banking crises.
We distinguish the end of three types of interven-
tions: Asset Support (FIN_ASSET-), liability sup-
port (FIN_LIABL-), and equity support
(FIN_RECAP-).
(continued)
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select the most relevant events while dropping those overlapping in the same time period.
However, this approach is unsuitable for us because we would lose a large number of obser-
vations due to the large number of policy interventions during the financial crisis, often
occurring within a very short time. Second, any criteria would imply an arbitrary evalu-
ation of the relative importance of two or more close policy interventions, and that may
alter the results. As a consequence, we prefer to keep all policy interventions in our sample,
then estimate the ARs for each G-SIB for every single day of the investigated period in
which at least one policy intervention was announced; and finally, account for the overlap-
ping effect by including dummy variables for each macro- and micro-category of policy
intervention. Specifically, in the second step of our analysis, when we investigate the deter-
minants of the market reaction with a multivariate regression, we check for any overlap-
ping of different types of intervention using a set of dummies (see Section 3.2 for more
details about our econometric approach).
A problematic issue is the effective surprise content of policy announcements.
Most papers dealing with the impact of monetary policy decisions on the stock market
Table I. Continued
Variables Symbol Description
End of financial
support on assets
FIN_ASSET- FIN_ASSET- includes the end of recovery measures
for banks in form of asset purchase or ring-fenc-
ing of bad assets and asset guarantees.
End of financial
support on liability
FIN_LIABL- FIN_LIABL- includes the end of recovery measures
for banks in form of guarantees for old or new
liabilities, enhancement of depositor protection
schemes, and provision of lender of last resort
facilities.
End of financial
support on equity
FIN_RECAP- FIN_RECAP- includes the end of capital injections
and nationalization (acquisition of controlling
share).
Bailouts and failures INACTION INACTION includes decisions allowing single
banks to fail or bailout. We distinguish two cases:
bank bailouts and assisted mergers (INA_BAIL)
and bank failures (INA_FAIL).
Bailouts and assisted
mergers
INA_BAIL INA_BAIL indicates bank bailouts and assisted
mergers.
Bank failures INA_FAIL INA_FAIL indicates bank failures.
Other measures OM OM is a residual category including stimulus and
austerity packages, administrative measures, re-
strictions on short selling and other announce-
ments that do not belong to previous categories
but are believed to generate a significant market
reaction. This is omitted in our models to avoid
multicollinearity.
Worldwide
intervention
WORLD WORLD is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is an intervention announced in the rest of the
world (i.e., in a different currency area).
Multiple intervention MULT MULT is a dummy variable equal to one if more
than one measure is announced in the same date.
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(e.g., Bomfin, 2003; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) distin-
guish between the expected and the unexpected interest rate changes. Nevertheless, as out-
lined by Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2012), information about the expected and officially announced
intensity of policy announcements is available only for some kinds of events (especially con-
ventional monetary policy) and for some countries (especially UK and USA). Consequently,
we do not disentangle expected from unexpected changes to avoid subjective classification
of policy interventions.
3.1 Estimating Abnormal Returns for Stock Prices
We measure the market reaction of G-SIBs and NFCs by estimating ARs as the difference
between actual stock returns and expected returns (i.e., those expected in the absence of
relevant events).
We select stock price time series for each of the 31 G-SIBs listed in Panel A of Table III.
We consider the banks included in the 2011 list but excluded from the 2012 update as level
1 banks. We also selected a control sample of 31 NFCs (reported in Panel B of Table III),
based on the FT Global 500 list of the world’s largest companies in 2007, ranked on market
capitalization. We selected companies to replicate the geographical composition of the sam-
ple of G-SIBs. Then, we used the control sample to conduct similar tests to see how their
CARs compare with the G-SIBs’.
There are several ways of measuring expected returns (see, e.g., Kothari and Warner,
2006). In our main models, we estimate the ARs by adopting the market model
(MacKinlay, 1997). Normal returns for every i-th observation (Rit) are obtained as a func-
tion of the market portfolio return (RMt), represented by a world equity index (MSCI
World Index):
Rit ¼ ai þ biRMt þ eit EðeitÞ ¼ 0; varðeitÞ ¼ r2ei (1)
Market model parameters are obtained with daily log returns of G-SIBs stock prices
over a 252-day estimation period that ends 20 days before the announcement. ARs are then
calculated as the difference between the actual stock return and the return predicted by the
market model:
ARit ¼ Rit  ða^i þ b^iRMtÞ (2)
ARs are then cumulated over a time period around the announcement date (t¼0) to
compute the CAR. Consistent with Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2010, 2012) and Fiordelisi, Galloppo,
and Ricci (2014), we focus on very short event windows to limit the problem of overlapping
events. Specifically, we measure the cumulative effect of the policy from the day before the
announcement to the day following the announcement [i.e., CAR (1,þ1)].5 CARs are ob-
tained as follows:
CARiðt1; t2Þ ¼
Xt2
t¼t1
ARit (3)
5 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. As a robustness check, we also
estimated CARs over the following event windows: (1,0), (0,0), and (0,þ1). Results are available
on request from the authors.
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Table III. Sample description
Panel A reports the list of the G-SIBs released by the Financial Stability Board on November 4,
2011. The list has been updated on November 1, 2012. Compared with the group of G-SIBs pub-
lished in 2011, two banks have been added (BBVA and Standard Chartered) and three banks
removed (Dexia, Commerzbank, and Lloyds), as a result of a decline in their global systemic im-
portance. Given that the observed period is 2007–12, we considered also the institutions that
have been removed in November 2012, leaving a total sample of 31 large banks. For Groupe
BPCE we considered the listed controlled company NATIXIS. Source: Financial Stability Board
(2011, 2012).
Panel B reports the list of NFCs included in our analysis. We selected 31 companies based on
the FT Global 500 list of the world’s largest companies in 2007 ranked by market capitalization.
Companies are selected to replicate the geographical composition of the sample of G-SIBs.
Source: Financial Times (2007).
Panel A—Global Systemically Important Banks
Bank Country Currency area
Credit Suisse Group CH CH
UBS CH CH
DEXIA BEL EUR
COMMERZBANK GER EUR
DEUTSCHE BANK GER EUR
GROUPE BPCE FRA EUR
BNP PARIBAS FRA EUR
CREDIT AGRICOLE FRA EUR
SOCIETE GENERALE FRA EUR
UNICREDIT ITA EUR
ING NED EUR
BANCO SANTANDER ESP EUR
BBVA ESP EUR
MITSUBISHI UFJ FINL JPN JPN
MIZUHO FINL JPN JPN
SUMITOMO MITSUI FINL JPN JPN
HSBC UK UK
LLOYDS UK UK
BARCLAYS UK UK
ROYAL BANK OF SCTL UK UK
STANDARD CHARTERED UK UK
CITIGROUP US US
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON US US
GOLDMAN SACHS US US
JP MORGAN CHASE US US
MORGAN STANLEY US US
STATE STREET US US
BANK OF AMERICA US US
WELLS FARGO US US
BANK OF CHINA CHI Other
NORDEA SWE Other
(continued)
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where t1 and t2 are the starting and the ending date of the considered window. ARs can
be aggregated on a time or a cross section basis for a portfolio of N observations.
The Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) is calculated as:
CAARðt1; t2Þ ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
CARiðt1; t2Þ (4)
As a robustness check, various recent papers (e.g., Madsen and Zachariah, 2015) use
both the market model and the market-adjusted method, in which expected returns are set
equal to the market portfolio returns on the days of interest, and hence abnormal returns
are simply the difference between the actual stock return and the market portfolio return
Table III. Continued
Panel B—Non-Financial Companies
Firm Currency area Industry
Nestle CH Food Producers
Roche CH Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Total EUR Oil & Gas Producers
EDF EUR Electricity
ENI EUR Oil & Gas Producers
Sanofi-Aventis EUR Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Telefonica EUR Fixed Line Telecommunications
Unilever EUR Food Producers
Siemens EUR Electronic & Electrical Equipment
Arcelor Mittal EUR Industrial Metals
Nokia EUR Technology Hardware & Equipment
E.ON EUR Gas, Water & Multiutilities
DaimlerChrysler EUR Automobiles & Parts
Toyota Motor JPN Automobiles & Parts
NTT DoCoMo JPN Mobile Telecommunications
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone JPN Fixed Line Telecommunications
Royal Dutch Shell UK Oil & Gas Producers
BP UK Oil & Gas Producers
GlaxoSmithKline UK Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Vodafone UK Mobile Telecommunications
AstraZeneca UK Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Exxon Mobil US Oil & Gas Producers
General Electric US General Industrials
Microsoft US Software & Computer Services
Procter & Gamble US Household Goods
Wal-Mart Stores US General Retailers
Altria US Tobacco
Pfizer US Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Johnson & Johnson US Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Sinopec Other Oil & Gas Producers
Ericsson Other Technology Hardware & Equipment
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in the same day. Simple market-adjusted returns around the announcement date are par-
ticularly useful in the absence of convincing evidence of which is the most appropriate
model for estimating abnormal returns (e.g., Draper and Paudyal, 2008; Gregory and
O’ Donohoe, 2014), or when available data do not allow estimation of “uncontaminated
risk parameters” (e.g., because relevant events are likely to be included in the estimation
period, rendering the beta estimation less meaningful, as outlined by Fuller, Netter, and
Stegemoller, 2002). The market-adjusted method has been used in past papers dealing with
crisis periods (e.g., Kutan, Muradoglu, and Sudjana, 2012), during which the estimation
window is likely to have different characteristics and risk-return dynamics with respect to
the event window. In our setting, the estimation period is likely to be contaminated by rele-
vant events, especially for G-SIBs (i.e., when calculating market model normal returns for
events in 2011, we use daily returns from 2010, which are already contaminated by policy
announcements). As such, to strengthen our results, we calculate G-SIBs and NFCs abnor-
mal returns using both the market model and the market-adjusted approach. By measuring
abnormal returns as a simple difference between the actual stock return and the market
portfolio return in the same day, we can take into account that risk parameters may be un-
stable during the observed period, so that using estimates from the estimation period to cal-
culate normal returns in the event window may have produced a bias in the market model
estimates.
To fully assess the effect of policy interventions on the banking industry, we also con-
sider the impact on G-SIBs’ CDS spreads. Like previous literature (e.g., Afonso, Furceri,
and Gomes, 2012), we consider CDS spreads for 5-year senior debt, drawn by the
Bloomberg database. Specifically, we measured CDS spread changes over the same event
window used for the stock price analysis (1,þ1), that is also common in the CDS litera-
ture (e.g., Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes, 2012). As such,
the CDS spread change is calculated as the difference between the CDS spread at time
tþ1 and the CDS spread at time t1, where t is the policy intervention announcement
day.
3.2 Econometric Approach
The main research hypothesis investigated in the article concerns the effect of each policy
intervention considered during the financial crisis, that is, the announcement of a policy
intervention increases AR for G-SIBs. After estimating CARs, we run a multivariate regres-
sion model to link policy interventions to CARs. Our dependent variables (y) are CARs,
that is, the abnormal return for the stock price of the single G-SIB in the considered event
window. Our independent variables are: a vector (X) of dummy variables indicating an an-
nouncement (or not) in each of the j-th macro-category of policy interventions,6 a dummy
variable (WORLD) indicating if policy interventions are also announced in another cur-
rency area (i.e., in a currency area different from that in which the bank operates), and
6 We consider bank failures and bailouts as a unique category because of the small number of ob-
servations (Table II). This is also consistent with the policy event categorization suggested by Ait-
Sahalia et al. (2012). We drop the category “Other measures” (OM): even though dummy variables
for several event types are not exactly mutually exclusive, the inclusion of this category may gen-
erate multicollinearity problems.
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MULT, a dummy variable indicating that there is more than one announcement in the same
date.7 As such, we estimate the following model:
CARi ¼ aþ
X
j
bjxi þ cWORLDi þMULTi þ ei (5)
We also run similar models to investigate the impact on the CDS spreads of G-SIBs and
the stock market reaction of the selected sample of NFCs. As shown in Table II, the tem-
poral distribution of policy interventions was quite heterogeneous during the investigated
period, as a consequence of the diverse stages of the financial crisis; for example, during the
global crisis period, several support measures for the financial sector were announced,
while during the subsequent sovereign debt crisis period most of these measures were re-
versed (e.g., several US banks were able to repay back TARP funds). To check for the effect
of time, we include quarter dummies. To check for the effect of unobserved variables that
remain constant for specific issuers over time, we also include bank (or firm) fixed effects
into our model.
4. Results
We discuss our empirical findings mainly focusing on the effect of policy interventions on
the banking industry (i.e., on the stock price and the CDS spread of G-SIBs). Our comments
are based on the most comprehensive estimates including both firm and time fixed effects.8
In Section 4.1, we discuss results for our general model in which we estimate the effect on
the macro-category level (as defined in Table II) on both G-SIBs and NFCs. This general
model implicitly assumes that G-SIBs are very large banks with a high level of international-
ization and that there are no strong differences among them. In Section 4.2, we explore the
possibility that differences deriving from the currency area in which G-SIBs are located
(and hence the stock market in which they are quoted) may influence the effect of policy
interventions.
4.1 A General Assessment of Various Types of Policy Intervention
In this section, we discuss the results obtained running a general model in which CARs for
each G-SIB are regressed on a set of dummy variables that identify several types of interven-
tion at the macro-category level (as defined in Table II). We use the following five different
dependent variables to have a broad and robust assessment of the effect of policy interven-
tions: the G-SIB’s abnormal stock returns (models 1 and 2), the G-SIB’s market-adjusted
stock returns (models 3 and 4), the G-SIB’s credit spread change (model 5 and 6), the
NFC’s abnormal stock returns (models 7 and 8), and the NFC’s market-adjusted stock re-
turns (models 9 and 10). For each dependent variable, we run the model twice. In models 1,
7 When there is only one announcement in the currency area where the bank operates, both MULT
and WORLD take the value of 0. When there is more than one announcement in the same currency
area where the bank operates, MULT takes the value of 1 and WORLD the value of 0. When there
is only one announcement in a currency area different from where the bank operates, MULT takes
the value of 0 and WORLD the value of 1.When there are several announcements, some in the
same currency area where the bank operates, and others in the rest of the world, both MULT and
WORLD take the value of 1.
8 Results for the models excluding time and firm fixed effects do not alter the main conclusions and
are available from the authors upon request.
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3, 5, 7, and 9 we consider dates in which more than one measure is announced; as such, we
include a dummy (MULT) to account for overlapping events. In the remaining models (i.e.,
2, 4, 6, 8, and 10), we limit observations to dates in which only one policy intervention is
announced (consequently, we do not need to include MULT). These models reduce difficul-
ties in interpreting results due to the elimination of overlapping events; however, the num-
ber of remaining policy interventions, and the explanatory power of the model,
substantially declines because overlapping interventions have been very frequent during the
financial crisis.
First, we focus on monetary policy interventions. Coefficient estimates for both expan-
sionary and restrictive monetary policy actions (MON_POL_EXP and MON_POL_RES,
respectively) are positive in both models 1 and 2 in Table IV. The coefficients are also statis-
tically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, indicating that investors generally
welcome monetary policy interventions for large banks. When we use market-adjusted
stock returns as dependent variable (models 3 and 4 in Table IV), results are similar: the in-
vestors’ reaction appears to be even stronger, resulting in statistical significance (at the
10% level) even in the model without overlapping announcements, at least in the case of
expansionary measures. Overall, this is a very interesting result: with reference to G-SIBs,
market participants are found to trust monetary policy authorities in times of crisis irre-
spective of the type of intervention. It is important to underline that we consider both
standard interest rate decisions and nonconventional measures. The link between bank
stock market prices and interest rates is a complex relationship, even in periods of stability,
since interest rates not only influence bank revenues but also impact credit demand, the
value of guarantees offered by debtors, and the value of financial instruments held by banks
for investment (see, e.g., Yin, Yang, and Handorf, 2010; Yin and Yang, 2013). In addition
to this, an increase in interest rates decreases the net present value of a bank’s future cash
flows. As a result, it is not easy to predict the final impact of changes in interest rates on
banks’ stock prices. Furthermore, in times of crisis, interest rate decisions are accompanied
by nonconventional measures, aiming at supporting funding banks and, hence, at enhanc-
ing credit to the private sector (see, e.g., ECB, 2010, 2011). Moving to the impact on G-
SIBs’ CDS spreads (models 5 and 6 of Table IV), we find that restrictive measures increase
the banks’ default risk perceived by investors: this is not surprising since an increase in
interest rates or a liquidity contraction may aggravate the solvency conditions of banks,
and it is likely that results are mainly driven by the CDS spread changes registered for the
weakest banks. We do not have conclusive results for expansionary measures. Looking at
market model abnormal returns for NFCs (models 7 and 8 of Table IV), we show a negative
reaction to both expansionary and restrictive monetary measures, with a higher level of sig-
nificance in the model considering all observations (similar results are also found with mar-
ket-adjusted returns; see Table IV, models 9 and 10). As outlined by Kiley (2014),
expansionary monetary policy has historically been associated with declines in interest
rates, and then, with higher equity prices. Under this traditional view, the negative reaction
of NFCs to expansionary announcements is a quite unexpected result; however, there are
some recent papers reporting that stock market prices negatively react to expansionary an-
nouncements. Kiley (2014) underlines that, after the crisis, the relationship between policy
interest rates and equity prices has been complicated by the zero lower bound, leading to a
decrease in the effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating the real economy. Similarly,
Woodford (2012) finds evidence of a weakened response of stock prices to policy an-
nouncements. Consistently with our results, Doh and Connolly (2013) shows that stock
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prices have often declined after the Federal Reserve has indicated a more accommodative
future policy path. According to the authors, financial markets may perceive the announce-
ment of a more accommodative monetary policy as coming from a worsening in the eco-
nomic outlook that depressed stock prices. All these papers are based on the US experience;
however, the same mechanisms (e.g., the effect of the zero lower bound and the association
between monetary policy announcements and economic outlook), may be easily extended
to other currency areas, and then to our analysis, contributing to explain the negative reac-
tion registered by NFCs in our analysis.
Second, we analyze the effect of other policy interventions aimed at supporting the
banking system. Looking at the market model abnormal returns for G-SIBs (Table IV, mod-
els 1 and 2), the announcement of recovery measures (FIN_SUPPORT) shows a positive
coefficient in both models and the one estimated in model 1 is also significant at the 5%
level. In contrast, the end of these measures (END_FIN_SUPPORT) displays a negative co-
efficient, statistically significant at the 10% level in model 2. In terms of sign of the coeffi-
cients, the results are substantially the same when using market-adjusted abnormal returns
(models 3 and 4 in Table IV). Consistently, the impact on CDS spreads shows a reduction
in risk for the announcement of FIN_SUPPORT (significant at 1% in model 5 in Table IV)
and an increase in risk for END_FIN_SUPPORT (significant at 1% in both models 5 and
6). Moving to the reaction for NFCs (Table IV, models 7, 8, 9 and 10), we observe a nega-
tive response for both the introduction and the end of measures to support banks (with a
high level of statistical significance for both market model abnormal returns and market-
adjusted returns).
Finally, we move onto cases in which public authorities prefer not to intervene. With
reference to G-SIBs, we find that policy decisions allowing a single bank to fail or bailout9
(INACTION) have a negative coefficient, significant at 1% in both models 1 and 2 in the
Table IV (also confirmed when using market-adjusted returns, models 3 and 4).
Consistently, the impact in terms of CDS spreads show an increase in the bank default risk
perceived by investors, significant at 1% in both models 5 and 6. In this case, the effect for
NFCs is similar to the one for G-SIBs: when significant, the reaction is negative, considering
both abnormal returns (models 7 and 8 in Table IV) or simple market-adjusted returns
(models 9 and 10 in Table IV).
Overall, considering all types of interventions in response to the financial crisis, and
both monetary policy and recovery measures for the banking industry, we can observe a
quite positive market reaction for large banks, and a negative one for large NFCs. Overall,
the general model provides some evidence in favor of our main hypothesis, that is, policy-
makers’ interventions generate a positive market reaction by investors and, hence, policy-
makers’ inaction produces an adverse reaction. Our findings are conclusive for the banking
sector (i.e., when we consider both stock price and CDS spread reactions for G-SIBs), while
they are less consistent for NFCs. In this case, the reaction is always negative for both an-
nouncements introducing and retiring support measures. This suggests that investors in
NFCs do not completely trust monetary authorities and governments. On the one hand,
they probably believe announced monetary and recovery measures are able to support
banks but unable to restore the real economy. On the other hand, there are some signals
9 Bailouts are cases in which policymakers were not able to prevent a crisis, but intervened in a fully
developed crisis, to guarantee an orderly resolution. Literally it is not inaction, but a ‘late action’.
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that these investors agree on the importance of impeding banks’ failures, as indicated by
their negative reaction to END_FIN_SUPPORT and INACTION.
This basic model implicitly assumes that G-SIBs are huge banks with a high level of
internationalization, and that there are no strong differences among them, due to the geo-
graphic area where they operate, or the stock market in which they are quoted. However,
we cannot take this strong assumption for granted and we have to test it using alternative
models that are presented in the next section.
4.2 The Role of Differences in Currency Areas
In this section, we explore the possibility of differences deriving from the currency area in
which G-SIBs are located, and hence the stock market in which they are quoted.
In the first step, we discuss results for a model in which all G-SIBs are considered to-
gether,10 and there are no policy interventions announced in currency areas different from
the one in which the bank operates (i.e., the dummy variable WORLD takes the value of
zero). The variable MULT is still included in the model, since it is possible to have several
announcements in the same currency area on the same date.
As shown in Table V, the explanatory power is much larger than for the base model,
perhaps signaling some differences due to the operation and listing in different currency
areas. Consistent with the general model in Table IV, we observe that both expansionary
and restrictive monetary policy decisions generally show positive coefficient estimates in
models 1–4, showing a favorable reaction among investors. The only exception is model 1
(using market model ARs as a dependent variable): the coefficient estimate for monetary
expansionary measures in model 1 is negative and significant at 10%. The announcement
of financial support measures (FIN_SUPPORT) is not found to produce any statistically
significant reaction in model 1, while the coefficient is negative and significant at 5% when
we consider model 2 (similar results are obtained using market-adjusted returns, see models
3 and 4). This suggests that, at the domestic level, the introduction of support measures is
interpreted by investors as a signal of weakness of local banks; this is consistent with the in-
crease in CDS spreads shown in both models 5 and 6 (significant at 1%). We also find that
the end of these support measures (END_FIN_SUPPORT) generates a positive market re-
action: as such, investors seems to interpret the end of these support measures as a signal of
recovery and renewed stability in the financial services industry, but this contrasts with the
contemporaneous increase in CDS spreads. For failures and bailouts (INACTION), find-
ings are very consistent with the general model shown in Table IV, showing a reduction in
value and an increase in risk.
Overall, the major differences with respect to the general model emerge for measures
aiming at restore the financial services industry. To better explore these differences, we run
separate models for two main currency areas (EUR and USA) of interest.
As shown in Table VI, expansionary monetary policy decisions are able to decrease the
perceived banks’ default risk in the EUR (i.e., the coefficient for CDS spreads is negative
and significant at 1%), while an opposite effect is found for the USA (i.e., the coefficient is
positive and significant at 1%). Enhancing liquidity conditions may be interpreted as a sig-
nal of weakness for local banks in the USA; this view is supported by the positive stock
price reaction registered by US G-SIBs with reference to restrictive measures.
10 In this case, the Bank of China and Nordea are excluded from the sample, since we did not collect
policy interventions for these currency areas.
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We now focus our attention on financial support measures by: (i) considering dates in
which there is only one announcement (MULT¼0); and (ii) including a more granular clas-
sification of financial support measures. Specifically, we distinguish our empirical findings,
focusing on three kinds of interventions: (a) recovery measures for banks in the form of
asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad assets and asset guarantees (FIN_ASSET); (b) recov-
ery measures for banks in the form of guarantees for old or new liabilities, enhancement of
depositor protection schemes, and provision of lender of last resort facilities (FIN_LIABL);
and (c) capital injections and nationalization, that is, acquisition of a controlling share
(FIN_RECAP).
Recovery measures in the form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad assets and asset
guarantees (FIN_ASSET) exhibit a positive link with CARs for G-SIBs operating in the
Table V. The effect of policy interventions on G-SIBs
Alternative model for domestic interventions
This table reports empirical results by running our base model using (i) Cumulated Abnormal
Returns calculated for G-SIBs, (ii) Market Adjusted Returns calculated for G-SIBs, and (iii)
changes in 5-year senior CDS spreads for G-SIBs. We consider all policy interventions
announced during June 2007–2012 and compute the effect using a 3-day event window
(1,þ1). We limit the sample to observations for which the dummy variableWORLD is equal to
zero (i.e., there are no interventions announced in currency areas different from that where the
bank operates). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.*, **, *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. MON_POL_EXP is a dummy variable indicating
expansionary measures taken by Central Banks.MON_POL_RES is a dummy variable indicating
restrictive measures taken by Central Banks. FIN_SUPPORT is a dummy variable corresponding
to financial sector policies including all instruments used to resolve systemic banking crises.
END_FIN_SUPPORT is a dummy variable indicating the end of FIN_SUPPORT measures.
INACTION is a dummy variable indicating decisions allowing single banks to fail or bailout.
MULT is a dummy variable equal to one if more than one measure is announced in the same
date. CONS is the intercept of the model.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y¼CAR Y¼CAR Y¼MAR Y¼MAR Y¼DCDS Y¼DCDS
MON_POL_EXP 0.06923* 0.02273 0.01428 0.00271 0.01288 0.07561
(0.03787) (0.03439) (0.03935) (0.03621) (0.03219) (0.04624)
MON_POL_RES 0.07553** 0.12632*** 0.08280*** 0.11021*** 0.04694* 0.11657***
(0.03170) (0.03777) (0.02918) (0.03710) 0.02606 (0.02698)
FIN_SUPPORT 0.04040 0.07836** 0.01630 0.09060*** 0.10027*** 0.15234***
(0.03318) (0.03512) (0.02954) (0.02918) (0.02184) (0.02010)
END_FIN_SUPPORT 0.14118*** 0.17447*** 0.14607*** 0.17736*** 0.07079** 0.13166***
(0.02846) (0.03100) (0.02672) (0.02967) 0.03229 (0.03643)
INACTION 0.47885*** 0.23963*** 0.49812*** 0.32362*** 0.42381*** 0.47988***
(0.06704) (0.06436) (0.06454) (0.05960) (0.07191) (0.07001)
MULT 0.04450 – 0.04744 – 0.03501 –
(0.04164) – (0.03867) – (0.03857) –
CONS 0.34060*** 0.39592*** 0.23391* 0.22863* 0.01101 0.10081*
(0.11816) (0.12267) (0.11724) (0.11739) (0.03318) (0.05643)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,213 2,695 3,213 2,695 2,703 2,276
R2 0.06036 0.06230 0.06326 0.06639 0.07125 0.05853
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EUR, which are significant at the 1% level when using market model abnormal returns
(model 1) and at the 5% level when using market-adjusted returns (model 2)—with no sig-
nificant effects on CDS spreads (model 3). In the USA, we do not find statistically signifi-
cant relationships between FIN_ASSET and market model abnormal returns (model 4), or
CDS spreads (model 6). However, when using market-adjusted returns (model 5), the coef-
ficient is negative and significant at the 5% level. Recovery measures in the form of
Table VI. The effect of the Financial support measures on G-SIBs—EUR versus USA
This table reports empirical results by running our base model using (i) Cumulated Abnormal
Returns calculated for G-SIBs, (ii) Market Adjusted Returns calculated for G-SIBs, and (iii)
changes in 5-year senior CDS spreads for G-SIBs, separately for the EUR and the USA. We con-
sider all policy interventions announced during June 2007–2012 and the compute the effect
using a 3-day event window (1,þ1). We limit the sample to observations for which the
dummy variableWORLD is equal to zero (i.e., there are no interventions announced in currency
area different from that where the bank operates). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.MON_POL_EXP
is a dummy variable indicating expansionary measures taken by Central Banks. MONPOLRES
is a dummy variable indicating restrictive measures taken by Central Banks. FIN_ASSET in-
cludes recovery measures for banks in form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad assets and
asset guarantees; FIN_LIABL includes recovery measures for banks in form of guarantees for
old or new liabilities, enhancement of depositor protection schemes, and provision of lender of
last resort facilities; FIN_RECAP includes capital injections and nationalization (acquisition of
controlling share). END_FIN_SUPPORT is a dummy variable indicating the end of
FIN_SUPPORT measures. INACTION is a dummy variable indicating decisions allowing single
banks to fail or bailout. CONTROL is a dummy variable equal to one if more than one measure
is announced in the same date. CONS is the intercept of the model.
EUR USA
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y¼CAR Y¼MAR Y¼DCDS Y¼CAR Y¼MAR Y¼DCDS
MON_POL_EXP 0.05612 0.07345 0.14449*** 0.02350 0.01977 0.12048***
(0.08343) (0.08490) (0.03591) (0.04881) (0.05010) (0.02772)
MON_POL_RES 0.00007 0.03600 0.01299 0.29339*** 0.31181*** 0.01787
(0.10538) (0.08893) (0.02288) (0.04707) (0.04751) (0.02506)
FIN_ASSET 0.41003*** 0.27582** 0.02623 0.25496 0.33480** 0.06189
(0.11665) (0.10277) (0.06279) (0.14457) (0.11851) (0.10665)
FIN_LIABL 0.00461 0.08115* 0.06654** 0.02775 0.02963 0.14286**
(0.04777) (0.04096) (0.02247) (0.24521) (0.23524) (0.04893)
FIN_RECAP 0.29498** 0.32598** 0.26346*** 0.02422 0.05540 0.18017**
(0.11319) (0.10586) (0.02561) (0.08112) (0.06367) (0.05834)
END_FIN_SUPPORT 0.37211* 0.58363** 0.17616*** 0.28699*** 0.29835*** 0.11518***
(0.19296) (0.19957) (0.04532) (0.07188) (0.06797) (0.02419)
INACTION 0.14693* 0.32392*** 0.35953*** 0.30937** 0.29326** 0.52990**
(0.07204) (0.06790) (0.06178) (0.09815) (0.08578) (0.15951)
CONSTANT 1.10858*** 1.23048*** 0.35953*** 0.33830*** 0.28076*** 0.52990**
(0.22879) (0.22097) (0.06178) (0.04054) (0.03558) (0.15951)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 911 911 1,070 1,384 1,384 1,272
R2 0.12320 0.11942 0.06223 0.10839 0.15214 0.18689
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guarantees for old or new liabilities, enhancement of depositor protection schemes, and
provision of lender of last resort facilities (FIN_LIABL), generally do not display a statistic-
ally significant relationship with stock price of G-SIBs, both in the EUR and USA (the only
exception is a negative coefficient, significant at 10% in model 2); and the effect on CDS
spreads is an increase in the default risk perceived by investors in both currency areas.
Finally, capital injections and nationalization (FIN_RECAP) generally exhibit a negative
link with stock prices, for both EUR and USA (significant at 5% only for the EUR, using
both market model and market-adjusted returns), with an increase in CDS spreads in both
currency areas.
European investors seem to have a more positive sentiment than US investors with re-
spect to public measures aimed at supporting the financial industry. This may be due to sev-
eral reasons, including the primary role of banks in the European financial services
industry, the fact that the global financial crisis originated in the USA (US banks may be
identified as responsible), and also to cultural differences generating a diverse perception of
the role of governments and markets. However, recapitalization measures seem to be not
welcomed by investors of the Euro zone. As already outlined in Panetta et al. (2009), results
may be explained by concerns about the dilution of shareholders’ rights, public intervention
in the bank management, and uncertainty about the duration of the plan.
Overall, it is possible to conclude that European investors are favorable to emergency
public interventions to save local banks, but, at the same time, are scared by the possibility
of a relevant and stable public inference in bank management.
5. Conclusions
During the crisis period, financial markets gave great attention to any actions (including
nonconventional ones) taken by policymakers to reduce risk and uncertainty in financial
markets. Indeed, policymakers throughout the world have run a wide set of policy interven-
tions using new instruments and techniques to restore the stability of banking systems.
What type of policy interventions achieved the best results? Our article answers this ques-
tion by analyzing the effect of a wide set of policymakers’ interventions (specifically, 1,322
policy interventions worldwide, between June 1, 2007 and June 30, 2012) on the stock
price and the CDS spreads of G-SIBs. As a robustness check, we also estimated the effect of
policy intervention on a control sample of 31 large NFCs.
We ran an event study to estimate stock market reactions around the announcement day
as a proxy for the success of each action. To strengthen our results, we calculated ARs using
both the market model and the market-adjusted approach, so that our conclusions are ro-
bust to possible model misspecification, contamination in the estimation window, and non-
stationarity of risk parameters.
Overall, the general model provides some evidence in favor of our main hypothesis, that
is, policymakers’ interventions generate a positive market reaction by investors and, hence,
policymakers’ inaction produces an adverse reaction. Findings appear conclusive for the
banking sector when considering the stock price of G-SIBs, especially for monetary policy
interventions, that are generally welcomed by investors irrespective of their expansionary
or restrictive direction. For NFCs, results are less favorable to our hypothesis. In this case,
the reaction is always negative for both announcements introducing and retiring support
measures. This is a signal that investors in NFCs do not completely believe in the ability of
monetary authorities and governments to restore the real economy or perceive
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accommodative and support measures as a signal of a negative economic outlook.
Nevertheless, these investors agree on the importance of impeding banks’ failures, as indi-
cated by their negative reaction to the end of support measures, bank failures, and bailouts.
Other interesting results concern the nature of G-SIBs. Despite their systemic relevance,
G-SIBs are not found to be equally responsive to global interventions; they are more sensi-
tive to policy interventions announced in their own currency areas. Furthermore, some
types of interventions are perceived in a different way depending on the geographic area
where the bank operates. A vivid example is given by financial support measures that gener-
ate diverse reactions in the EUR and in the USA. With respect to the USA, in Europe there
is a more positive sentiment about public measures to support the financial industry, but
some kinds of measures are negatively perceived in both areas. Overall, our article finds
that, despite their global nature, G-SIBs are quite different from one another and show
stronger reaction to domestic policy interventions.
We acknowledge some limitations of our analysis due to the adoption of the event study
approach and to the problem of overlapping events. However, the adopted methodology is
the only way to investigate investors’ reactions and expectations in a period in which inter-
ventions have been implemented at a frenetic pace. Overall, we believe that this study pro-
vides important evidence on the effect of monetary and government interventions in
response to the global financial crisis, showing that, even though the crisis and the largest
world banks are generally considered to be global, there is no unique recipe for restoring
the banks. Quite the opposite: there is very strong heterogeneity across institutions of differ-
ent systemic relevance and location, and between investors interested in the financial ser-
vices industry or in other sectors of the “real economy”.
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